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Abstract
In this paper, in an exchange economy with atoms and an atomless
part, we analyze the relationship between the set of the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium allocations of a strategic market game and the set of the
Walras equilibrium allocations of the exchange economy with which
it is associated. In an example, we show that, even when atoms are
countably infinite, Cournot-Nash equilibria yield different allocations
from the Walras equilibrium allocations of the underlying exchange
economy. We partially replicate the exchange economy by increasing
the number of atoms without affecting the atomless part while ensur-
ing that the measure space of agents remains finite. We show that any
sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic mar-
ket game associated with the partially replicated exchange economies
approximates a Walras equilibrium allocation of the original exchange
economy.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D51.
1 Introduction
Okuno at al. (1980) proposed an approach to modeling oligopoly in general
equilibrium where “[...] either perfectly or imperfectly competitive behav-
ior may emerge endogenously [...], depending on the characteristics of the
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agent and his place in the economy” (see p. 22). Okuno et al. (1980) pro-
posed to use a mixed measure space of traders a` la Shitovitz (see Shitovitz
(1973)) - that is a measure space consisting of atoms, which represent the
large traders, and an atomless part, which represents the small traders - in
the framework of strategic market games (see Shapley and Shubik (1977),
Dubey and Shubik (1978), Mas-Colell (1982), Sahi and Yao (1989), Amir et
al. (1990), Peck et al. (1992), Dubey and Shapley (1994), among others).
Busetto et al. (2011), in a generalization of Okuno et al. (1980), considered
a model of noncooperative exchange proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley (and
further analyzed by Sahi and Yao (1989)): they proved the existence of a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium for this model. The approach adopted by Okuno
et al. (1980) contrasts to an approach to noncooperative oligopoly in general
equilibrium proposed by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) (see also Roberts and
Sonnenschein (1977), Roberts (1980), Mas-Colell (1982), Dierker and Gro-
dal (1986), Codognato and Gabszewicz (1993), d’Aspremont et al. (1997),
Gabszewicz and Michel (1997), Shitovitz (1997), among others). In this ap-
proach, it is explicitly assumed that some agents behave competitively while
others behave noncompetitively.
In this paper, using the same framework as Busetto et al. (2011), without
assuming that some agents behave competitively while others behave non-
competitively, we analyze the relationship between the set of the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market game and set of the
Walras equilibrium allocations of the exchange economy with which it is
associated. Since the mixed measure space we are considering in this paper
may contain countably infinite atoms, the question arises whether an equiv-
alence result could hold in this case. We provide an example of an exchange
economy with countably infinite atoms and an atomless part which shows
that any Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocation of the strategic market game
is not a Walras equilibrium allocation of the exchange economy with which
it is associated. Our example contrasts with the counterintuitive possibility
that the core allocations are competitive despite the presence of atoms as in
Shitovitz (1973).
The nonequivalence result provided by the example leads to consider the
question of a possible asymptotic relationship between appropriately defined
sequences of Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market
game and the Walras equilibrium allocations of the exchange economy with
which it is associated. To this end, we partially replicate the exchange econ-
omy by increasing the number of atoms, while making them asymptotically
negligible, without affecting the atomless part. The replication of atoms
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used in this paper ensures that the mixed measure space remains finite:
without this feature required, the model of oligopoly in general equilibrium
we study would not be well-defined. Then, we show that any sequence
of Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market game as-
sociated with the partially replicated exchange economies approximates a
Walras equilibrium allocation of the original exchange economy.
Sahi and Yao (1989) showed the convergence of sequences of Cournot-
Nash equilibrium allocations to a Walras equilibrium allocation starting
from a finite exchange economy by replicating traders. Codognato and
Ghosal (2000) showed the equivalence between Cournot-Nash and Walras
equilibrium allocations in exchange economies with an atomless continuum
of traders. While our convergence result synthesizes elements of both these
papers, there are two new elements. First, the replication of atoms we use
is different form the one used by Sahi and Yao (1989) for a finite number of
traders: our replication ensures that the mixed measure space remains finite
and, further, the convergence proof relies in an essential way on it. Second,
we have to solve a new technical issue: in order to ensure that a sequence
of Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations approximates a Walras equilibrium
allocation, we have to use a version of Fatou’s Lemma in several dimensions
proved by Artstein (1979).
Some limit results have already been proved in the approach adopted by
Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), where competitive or noncompetitive traders’
behavior is explicitly assumed (see Roberts (1980), Mas-Colell (1983), Nov-
shek and Sonnenschein ((1983), (1987)), among others). Here, consistently
with the Okuno et al. (1980)’s approach we have adopted, we prove a
limit result a` la Cournot (see Cournot (1838)) without making any further
behavioral assumption and preserving the feature that the mixed measure
space remains finite.
2 The mathematical model
We consider a pure exchange economy, E, with large traders, represented
as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. The space
of traders is denoted by the measure space (T, T , µ), where T is the set of
traders, T is the σ-algebra of all µ-measurable subsets of T , and µ is a real
valued, non-negative, countably additive measure defined on T . We assume
that (T, T , µ) is finite, i.e., µ(T ) <∞. This implies that the measure space
(T, T , µ) contains at most countably many atoms. Let T1 denote the set of
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atoms and T0 = T \ T1 the atomless part of T . A null set of traders is a
set of measure 0. Null sets of traders are systematically ignored throughout
the paper. Thus, a statement asserted for “all” traders, or “each” trader,
or “each” trader in a certain set is to be understood to hold for all such
traders except possibly for a null set of traders. The word “integrable” is to
be understood in the sense of Lebesgue.
In the exchange economy, there are l different commodities. A com-
modity bundle is a point in Rl+. An assignment (of commodity bundles
to traders) is an integrable function x: T → Rl+. There is a fixed initial
assignment w, satisfying the following assumption.
Assumption 1. w(t) > 0, for each t ∈ T .
An allocation is an assignment x for which
∫
T x(t) dµ =
∫
T w(t) dµ.
The preferences of each trader t ∈ T are described by a utility function
ut : R
l
+ → R, satisfying the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. ut : R
l
+ → R is continuous, strongly monotone in Rl++,
quasi-concave, for each t ∈ T0, and concave, for each t ∈ T1.
Let B(Rl+) denote the Borel σ-algebra of Rl+. Moreover, let T
⊗B
denote the σ-algebra generated by the sets E × F such that E ∈ T and
F ∈ B.
Assumption 3. u : T × Rl+ → R given by u(t, x) = ut(x), for each t ∈ T
and for each x ∈ Rl+, is T
⊗B measurable.
We also need the following assumption (see Sahi and Yao (1989)).
Assumption 4. There are at least two traders in T1 for whom w(t)À 0; ut
is continuously differentiable in Rl++; {x ∈ Rl+ : ut(x) = ut(w(t))} ⊂ Rl++.
A price vector is a vector p ∈ Rl+. A Walras equilibrium of E is a pair
(p∗,x∗), consisting of a price vector p∗ and an allocation x∗, such that, for
each t ∈ T , ut(x∗(t)) ≥ ut(y), for all y ∈ {x ∈ Rl+ : p∗x = p∗w(t)}.
We introduce now the strategic market game Γ associated with E. Let
b ∈ Rl2+ be a vector such that b = (b11, b12, . . . , bll−1, bll). A strategy corre-
spondence is a correspondence B : T → P(Rl2+) such that, for each t ∈ T ,
B(t) = {b ∈ Rl2+ :
∑l
j=1 bij ≤ wi(t), i = 1, . . . , l}. A strategy selection is
an integrable function b : T → Rl2 , such that, for each t ∈ T , b(t) ∈ B(t).
For each t ∈ T , bij(t), i, j = 1, . . . , l, represents the amount of commodity
i that trader t offers in exchange for commodity j. Given a strategy selec-
tion b, we define the aggregate matrix B¯ = (
∫
T bij(t) dµ). Moreover, we
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denote by b \ b(t) a strategy selection obtained by replacing b(t) in b with
b ∈ B(t). With some abuse of notation, b \ b(t) will also denote the value
of the strategy selection b \ b(t) at t.
Then, we introduce two further definitions (see Sahi and Yao (1989)).
Definition 1. A nonnegative square matrix A is said to be irreducible if,
for every pair i, j, with i 6= j, there is a positive integer k = k(i, j) such that
a
(k)
ij > 0, where a
(k)
ij denotes the ij-th entry of the k-th power A
k of A.
Definition 2. Given a strategy selection b, a price vector p is market clear-
ing if
p ∈ Rl++,
l∑
i=1
pib¯ij = p
j(
l∑
i=1
b¯ji), j = 1, . . . , l. (1)
By Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao (1989), there is a unique, up to a scalar
multiple, price vector p ∈ Rl++ satisfying (1) if and only if B¯ is irreducible.
Given a strategy selection b, let p(b) be a function such that p(b) is the
unique, up to a scalar multiple, price vector p ∈ Rl++ satisfying (1), if B¯ is
irreducible, p(b) = 0, otherwise.
Given a strategy selection b and a price vector p ∈ Rl+, consider the
assignment determined as follows:
xj(t,b(t), p) = wj(t)−
l∑
i=1
bji(t) +
l∑
i=1
bij(t)
pi
pj
, if p ∈ Rl++,
xj(t,b(t), p) = wj(t), otherwise,
for each t ∈ T , j = 1, . . . , l. Given a strategy selection b, the traders’ final
holdings are given by x(t) = x(t,b(t), p(b)), for each t ∈ T .
It is straightforward to show that the assignment corresponding to the
final holdings is an allocation. This reformulation of the Shapley’s model
allows us to define the following concept of Cournot-Nash equilibrium for ex-
change economies with an atomless part (see Codognato and Ghosal (2000)).
Definition 3. A strategy selection bˆ such that ¯ˆB is irreducible is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of Γ if
ut(x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ))) ≥ ut(x(t, bˆ \ b(t), p(bˆ \ b(t)))),
for all b ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T .
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3 The existence of a δ-positive Cournot-Nash equi-
librium of Γ
We introduce now the notion of a δ-positive strategy correspondence which
was used by Sahi and Yao (1989) to prove their existence and limit theorems
and which we shall use here for the same purposes. Let T¯1 ⊂ T1 be a set
consisting of two traders in T1 for whom Assumption 4 holds. Moreover,
let δ = mint∈T¯1{1l min{w1(t), . . . ,wl(t)}}. We say that the correspondence
Bδ : T → Rl2 is a δ-positive strategy correspondence if Bδ(t) = B(t) ∩ {b ∈
Rl
2
:
∑
i6∈J
∑
j∈J(bij + bji) ≥ δ, for each J ⊆ {1, . . . , l}}, for each t ∈ T¯1;
Bδ(t) = B(t), for the remaining traders t ∈ T . We say that a strategy
selection b is δ-positive if b(t) ∈ Bδ(t), for each t ∈ T . Moreover, we say
that a Cournot-Nash equilibrium bˆ of Γ is δ-positive if bˆ is a δ-positive
strategy selection. The following theorem, which follows straightforwardly
from the existence theorem in Busetto et al. (2011), shows the existence of
a δ-positive Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a δ-positive
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ, bˆ
Proof. Busetto et al. (2011) showed that, under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and
4, there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ, bˆ, such that, for each t ∈ T ,
bˆ(t) ∈ Bδ(t). This implies that bˆ is a δ-positive Cournot-Nash equilibrium
of Γ.
4 An example
Codognato and Ghosal (2000) analyzed the Sahi and Yao (1989)’s model in
exchange economies with an atomless continuum of traders. In this frame-
work, they showed an equivalence result a` la Aumann (see Aumann (1964))
between the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of Γ and the
set of the Walras equilibrium allocations of E. The mixed measure space we
are considering here may contain countably infinite atoms. This raises the
question whether an equivalence result a` la Aumann could hold in this case.
The following example considers an exchange economy E with countably
infinite atoms and it shows that any Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocation of
the strategic market game Γ associated with E is not a Walras equilibrium
allocation of E.
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Example. Consider an exchange economy E where l = 2, T1 = T
′
1 ∪ T ′′1 ,
T ′1 = {2, 3}, T ′′1 = {4, 5, . . .}, T0 = [0, 1], w(2) = w(3)À 0, w(t) = (0, 1), for
each t ∈ T ′′1 ∪ T0, ut(·) satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3, for each t ∈ T , u2(·)
and u3(·) satisfy Assumption 4, u2(x) = u3(x), ut(x) > ut(y), whenever
x ∈ Rl++ and y ∈ (Rl+ \ Rl++), for each t ∈ T ′′1 ∪ T0, µ is the Lebesgue
measure, when restricted to T0, and µ(t) = (
1
2)
t, for each t ∈ T1. Then, if bˆ
is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ, the pair (pˆ, xˆ) such that pˆ = p(bˆ) and
xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), pˆ), for each t ∈ T , is not a Walras equilibrium of E.
Proof. Suppose that bˆ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ and that the
pair (pˆ, xˆ) such that pˆ = p(bˆ) and xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), pˆ), for each t ∈ T , is
a Walras equilibrium of E. Clearly, bˆ21(t) > 0, for each t ∈ T ′′1 ∪ T0. Let
h =
∫
T ′′1 ∪T0 bˆ21(t) dµ. Since, for each t ∈ T
′
1, at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
the marginal price (see Okuno et al. (1980)) must be equal to the marginal
rate of substitution which, in turn, at a Walras equilibrium, must be equal
to the relative price of commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2, we must have
dx2
dx1
= −pˆ2 bˆ12(t)
bˆ21(t) + h
= −pˆ,
for each t ∈ T ′1. But then, we must also have
bˆ21(2) + h
bˆ12(2)
=
bˆ21(2) + bˆ21(3) + h
bˆ12(2) + bˆ12(3)
=
bˆ21(3) + h
bˆ12(3)
. (2)
The last equality in (2) holds if and only if bˆ21(2) = k(bˆ21(3) + h) and
bˆ12(2) = kbˆ12(3), with k > 0. But then, the first and the last members of
(2) cannot be equal because
k(bˆ21(3) + h) + h
kbˆ12(3)
6= bˆ21(3) + h
bˆ12(3)
.
This implies that the pair (pˆ, xˆ) such that pˆ = p(bˆ) and xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), pˆ),
for each t ∈ T , cannot be a Walras equilibrium of E.
The example shows that the condition that E contains a countably in-
finite number of atoms is not sufficient to guarantee that the set of the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of Γ coincides with the set of the
Walras equilibrium allocations of E. This leads us to consider the ques-
tion whether partially replicating E a` la Cournot (see Cournot (1838) - that
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is increasing the number of atoms, while making them asymptotically neg-
ligible, without affecting the atomless part - would generate sequences of
Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations which approximate, in some way, a
Walras equilibrium allocation of E. We shall address this question in the
following sections.
5 The replication a` la Cournot of E
We consider the replication a` la Cournot of E which, by analogy with the
replication proposed by Cournot (1838) in a partial equilibrium framework,
consists in replicating only the atoms of E, while making them asymptoti-
cally negligible. Let En be an exchange economy characterized as in Section
2 where each atom is replicated n times. For each t ∈ T1, let tr denote r-th
element of the n-fold replication of t. We assume thatw(tr) = w(ts) = w(t),
utr(·) = uts(·) = ut(·), r, s = 1, . . . , n, µ(tr) = µ(t)n , r = 1, . . . , n, for each
t ∈ T1. Clearly, E coincides with E1.
The strategic market game Γn associated with En can then be charac-
terized, mutatis mutandis, as in Section 2. Clearly, Γ coincides with Γ1.
A strategy selection b of Γn is atom-type-symmetric if bn(tr) = bn(ts),
r, s = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1. We can now provide the definition of an
atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn.
Definition 4. A strategy selection bˆ such that ¯ˆB is irreducible is an atom-
type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn if bˆ is atom-type-symmetric
and
utr(x(tr, bˆ(tr), p(bˆ
n))) ≥ utr(x(tr, bˆ \ b(tr), p(bˆ \ b(tr)))),
for all b ∈ B(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, and for each t ∈ T1;
ut(x(t, bˆ(t), p(bˆ))) ≥ ut(x(t, bˆ \ b(t), p(bˆ \ b(t)))),
for all b ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T0.
6 The existence of a δ-positive atom-type-symme-
tric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn
Let δ be determined as in Section 3 and define the δ-positive strategy cor-
respondence Bδ, mutatis mutandis, as in Section 3. Notice that Bδ(tr) =
Bδ(ts), r, s = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1. We say that a strategy selection b is
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δ-positive if b(tr) ∈ Bδ(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, b(t) ∈ Bδ(t), for
each t ∈ T0. Moreover, we say that an atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash
equilibrium bˆ of Γn is δ-positive if bˆ is a δ-positive strategy selection. The
following theorem shows the existence of an atom-type-symmetric δ-positive
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a δ-positive
atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn, bˆ.
Proof. Following Sahi and Yao (1989) and Busetto et al. (2011), we define
the game Γn(²). Given ² > 0 and a strategy selection b, we define the
aggregate bid matrix B¯² = (b¯ij + ²). Clearly, the matrix B¯
² is irreducible.
The interpretation is that an outside agency places fixed bids of ² for each
pair of commodities (i, j). Given ² > 0, we denote by p²(b) the function
which associates, with each strategy selection b, the unique, up to a scalar
multiple, price vector which satisfies
l∑
i=1
pi(b¯ij + ²) = p
j(
l∑
i=1
(b¯ji + ²), j = 1, . . . , l. (3)
Definition 5. Given ² > 0, a strategy selection bˆ² is an atom-type-symmetric
²-Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn(²) if bˆ² is atom-type-symmetric and
utr(x(tr, bˆ
²(tr), p²(bˆ²))) ≥ utr(tr, bˆ² \ b(tr), p²(bˆ² \ b(tr)))),
for all b ∈ B(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, and for each t ∈ T1;
ut(x(t, bˆ
²(t), p²(bˆ²))) ≥ ut(t, bˆ² \ b(t), p²(bˆ² \ b(t)))),
for all b ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T0.
We neglect, as usual, the distinction between integrable functions and
equivalence classes of such functions. The locally convex Hausdorff space we
shall be working in is L1(µ,R
l2), endowed with its weak topology. Denote by
L1(µ,R
l2) the set of integrable functions taking values in Rl
2
, by L1(µ,B(·))
the set of strategy selections, and by L1(µ,B
∗(·)) the set of atom-type-
symmetric strategy selections.
The first lemma has been proved by Busetto et al. (2011).
Lemma 1. The set L1(µ,B(·)) is nonempty, convex and weakly compact.
The next lemma provides us with the properties of L1(µ,B
∗(·)) required
for the application of the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem (see Theorem
17.55 in Aliprantis and Border (2006), p. 583).
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Lemma 2. The set L1(µ,B
∗(·)) is nonempty, convex and weakly compact.
Proof. L1(µ,B
∗(·)) is nonempty, convex and it has a weakly compact clo-
sure by the same argument used by Busetto et al. (2011). Now, let {bm} be a
convergent sequence of L1(µ,B
∗(·)). Since L1(µ,Rl2) is complete, {bm} con-
verges in the mean to an integrable function b. But then, there exists a sub-
sequence {bkm} of {bm} such that bkm(tr) converges to b(tr), r = 1, . . . , n,
for each t ∈ T1, and bkm(t) converges to b(t), for each t ∈ T0 (see Theorem
25.5 in Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1998), p. 203). The compactness of
B(t), for each t ∈ T , and the fact that bkm(tr) = bkm(ts), r, s = 1, . . . , n,
for each t ∈ T1, implies that b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)). Hence L1(µ,B∗(·)) is norm
closed and, since it is also convex, it is weakly closed (see Corollary 4 in
Diestel (1984), p. 12).
Now, given ² > 0, let α²tr : L1(µ,B
∗(·)) → B(tr) be a correspondence
such that α²tr(b) = argmax{utr(x(t,b\b(tr), p²(b\b(tr)))) : b ∈ B(tr)}, r =
1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and let α²t : L1(µ,B(·))→ B(t) be a correspondence
such that α²t(b) = argmax{ut(x(t,b\ b(t), p²(b\ b(t)))) : b ∈ B(t)}, for each
t ∈ T0. Let α² : L1(µ,B∗(·)) → L1(µ,B(·)) be a correspondence such
that α²(b) = {b ∈ L1(µ,B(·)) : b(tr) ∈ α²tr(b), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈
T1, and b(t) ∈ α²t(b), for each t ∈ T0}.
The following lemma can be proved by the same argument used to show
Lemma 2 in Busetto et al. (2011).
Lemma 3. Given ² > 0, the correspondence α² : L1(µ,B
∗(·))→ L1(µ,B(·))
is such that the set α²(b) is nonempty and convex, for all b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)),
and it has a weakly closed graph.
We say that an atom-type-symmetric ²-Cournot-Nash equilibrium bˆ² of
Γn(²) is δ-positive if bˆ² is a δ-positive strategy selection.
Now, given ² > 0, let α²δtr : L1(µ,B
∗(·)) → B(tr) be a correspon-
dence such that α²δtr(b) = α
²
tr(b) ∩ Bδ(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1,
and let α²t : L1(µ,B(·)) → B(t) be a correspondence such that α²δt (b) =
α²t(b) ∩ Bδ(t), for each t ∈ T0. Let α²δ : L1(µ,B∗(·)) → L1(µ,B(·)) be a
correspondence such that α²δ(b) = {b ∈ L1(µ,B(·)) : b(tr) ∈ α²δtr(b), r =
1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and b(t) ∈ α²δt (b), for each t ∈ T0}.
Moreover, given ² > 0, let α²δ∗ : L1(µ,B∗(·)) → L1(µ,B∗(·)) be a cor-
respondence such that α²δ∗(b) = α²δ(b) ∩ L1(µ,B∗(·)). Now, we are ready
to prove the existence of a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric ²-Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of Γn(²).
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Lemma 4. Given ² > 0, there exists a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric
²-Cournot-Nash equilibrium bˆ² of Γn(²).
Proof. Let ² > 0 be given. By Lemma 6 in Sahi and Yao (1989), we know
that, for each b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)), α²δtr(b) is nonempty, r = 1, . . . , n, for each
t ∈ T¯1. Moreover, for each b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)) and for each t ∈ T1, there
exists b¯ ∈ B(t) such that b¯ ∈ α²δtr(b), r = 1, . . . , n as b is an atom-type-
symmetric strategy profile. But then, by the same argument of Lemma 2 in
Busetto et al. (2011), α²δ∗(b) is nonempty. The convexity of α²δ(b), for each
b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)), is a straightforward consequence of the convexity of α²tr(b)
and Bδ(t), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and of α²t(b) and Bδ(t), for each
t ∈ T0. But then, α²δ∗ is convex valued as L1(µ,B∗(·)) is convex. α²δtr is upper
hemicontinuous and compact valued, r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, as it is the
intersection of the correspondence α²tr, which is upper hemicontinuous and
compact valued by Lemma 2 in Busetto et al. (2011), and the continuous
and compact valued correspondence which assigns to each strategy selection
b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)) the strategy set Bδ(tr) (see Theorem 17.25 in Aliprantis
and Border (2006), p. 567). Moreover, α²δt is upper hemicontinuous and
compact valued, for each t ∈ T0, using the same argument. Therefore,
α²δ has a weakly closed graph, by the same argument used in the proof of
Lemma 3. Finally, α²δ∗ has a weakly closed graph as it is the intersection of
the correspondence α²δ and the continuous correspondence which assigns to
each strategy selection b ∈ L1(µ,B∗(·)) the weakly closed set L1(µ,B∗(·))
which, by the Closed Graph Theorem (see Theorem 17.11 in Aliprantis and
Border (2006), p. 561), has a weakly closed graph (see Theorem 17.25 in
Aliprantis and Border (2006), p. 567). But then, by the Kakutani-Fan-
Glicksberg Theorem (see Theorem 17.55 in Aliprantis and Border (2006), p.
583), there exists a fixed point bˆ² of the correspondence α²δ∗ and hence a
δ-positive atom-type-symmetric ²-Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn(²).
Let ²m =
1
m , m = 1, 2, . . .. By Lemma 4, for each m = 1, 2, . . ., there is
a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric ²-Cournot-Nash equilibrium bˆ²m . The
fact that the sequence {Bˆ²m} belongs to the compact set {bij ∈ Rl2 :
bij ≤ n
∫
T1
wi(t) dµ +
∫
T0
wi(t) dµ, i, j = 1, . . . , l,
∑
i6∈J
∑
j∈J(bij + bji) ≥
n
∫
T¯1
δ dµ, for each J ⊆ {1, . . . , l}}, the sequence {bˆ²m(tr)} belongs to the
compact set Bδ(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and the sequence {pˆ²m},
where pˆ²m = p(bˆ²m), for eachm = 1, 2, . . ., belongs, by Lemma 9 in Sahi and
Yao (1989), to a compact set P, implies that there is a subsequence {Bˆ²km}
of the sequence {Bˆ²m} which converges to an element of the set {bij ∈ Rl2 :
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bij ≤ n
∫
T1
wi(t) dµ +
∫
T0
wi(t) dµ, i, j = 1, . . . , l,
∑
i6∈J
∑
j∈J(bij + bji) ≥
n
∫
T¯1
δ dµ, for each J ⊆ {1, . . . , l}}, a subsequence {bˆ²km (tr)} of the se-
quence {bˆ²m(tr)} which converges to an element of the set Bδ(tr), r =
1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and a subsequence {pˆ²km} of the sequence {pˆ²m}
which converges to an element of the set P . Since the sequence {bˆ²km} sat-
isfies the assumptions of Theorem A in Artstein (1979), there is a function
bˆ such that bˆ(tr) is the limit of the sequence {bˆ²km (tr)}, r = 1, . . . , n, for
each t ∈ T1, bˆ(t) is a limit point of the sequence {bˆ²km (t)}, for each t ∈ T0,
and such that the sequence {Bˆ²km} converges to ¯ˆB. Then, bˆ(tr) = bˆ(ts)
as {bˆ²km (tr)} = {bˆ²km (ts)}, r, s = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, and bˆ(tr) is
the limit of the sequence {bˆ²km (tr)}, r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1. Hence,
it can be proved, by the same argument used by Busetto et al. (2011) to
show their existence theorem, that bˆ is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn(²).
7 The limit theorem
The following theorem shows that the sequences of Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium allocations generated by the replication a` la Cournot of E approximate
a Walras equilibrium allocation of E. In particular, the next theorem shows
that given a sequence of atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium al-
locations of Γn, there exists a Walras equilibrium allocation of E such that,
for each trader, his final holding at this Walras equilibrium is a limit point
of the sequence of his final holdings at the sequence of atom-type-symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of Γn.
We now state and prove the limit theorem.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let {bˆn} be a sequence of
strategy selections of Γ and let {pˆn} be a sequence of prices such that bˆn(t) =
bˆΓ
n
(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T1, bˆn(t) = bˆΓn(t), for each t ∈ T0, and
pˆn = p(bˆΓ
n
), where bˆΓ
n
is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of Γn, for n = 1, 2, . . .. Then, (i) there exists a subsequence
{bˆkn} of the sequence {bˆn}, a subsequence {pˆkn} of the sequence {pˆn}, a
strategy selection bˆ of Γ, and a price vector pˆ, with p À 0, such that bˆ(t)
is the limit of the sequence {bˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T1, bˆ(t) is a limit point
of the sequence {bˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T0, the sequence {Bˆkn} converges
to Bˆ, and the sequence {pˆkn} converges to pˆ; (ii) xˆ(t) is the limit of the
sequence {xˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T1, and xˆ(t) is a limit point of the sequence
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{xˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T0, where xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), pˆ) for each t ∈ T , xˆkn(t) =
x(t, bˆkn(t), pˆkn), for each t ∈ T , and for n = 1, 2, . . .; (iii) The pair (pˆ, xˆ) is
a Walras equilibrium of E.
Proof (i) Let {bˆn} be a sequence of strategy selections of Γ and let {pˆn}
be a sequence of prices such that bˆn(t) = bˆΓ
n
(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each
t ∈ T1, bˆn(t) = bˆΓn(t), for each t ∈ T0, and pˆn = p(bˆΓn), where bˆΓn
is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γn, for
n = 1, 2, . . .. The fact that the sequence {Bˆn} belongs to the compact
set {bij ∈ Rl2 : bij ≤
∫
T w
i(t) dµ, i, j = 1, . . . , l,
∑
i6∈J
∑
j∈J(bij + bji) ≥∫
T¯1
δ dµ, for each J ⊆ {1, . . . , l}}, the sequence {bˆn(t)} belongs to the com-
pact set Bδ(t), for each t ∈ T1, and the sequence {pˆn}, belongs, by Lemma
9 in Sahi and Yao, to a compact set P, implies that there is a subse-
quence {Bˆkn} of the sequence {Bˆn} which converges to an element of the
set {bij ∈ Rl2 : bij ≤
∫
T w
i(t) dµ, i, j = 1, . . . , l,
∑
i6∈J
∑
j∈J(bij + bji) ≥∫
T¯1
δ dµ, for each J ⊆ {1, . . . , l}}, a subsequence {bˆkm(t)} of the sequence
{bˆn(t)} which converges to an element of the set Bδ(t), for each t ∈ T1,
and a subsequence {pˆkn} of the sequence {pˆn} which converges to an el-
ement pˆ of the set P . Moreover, by Lemma 9 in Sahi and Yao, pˆ À 0.
Since the sequence {bˆkn} satisfies the assumptions of Theorem A in Art-
stein (1979), there is a function bˆ such that bˆ(t) is the limit of the sequence
{bˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T1, bˆ(t) is a limit point of the sequence {bˆkn(t)}, for
each t ∈ T0, and such that the sequence {Bˆkn} converges to Bˆ. (ii) Let
xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), pˆ) for each t ∈ T , xˆkn(t) = x(t, bˆkn(t), pˆkn), for each t ∈ T ,
and for n = 1, 2, . . .. Then, xˆ(t) is the limit of the sequence {xˆkn(t)}, for
each t ∈ T1, as bˆ(t) is the limit of the sequence {bˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T1,
and the sequence {pˆkn} converges to pˆ, xˆ(t) is a limit point of the sequence
{xˆkn(t)}, for each t ∈ T0, as bˆ(t) is a limit point of the sequence {bˆkn(t)}, for
each t ∈ T0, and the sequence {pˆkn} converges to pˆ. (iii) BˆΓn = Bˆn as bˆΓnij =∑
t∈T1
∑n
r=1 bˆ
Γn
ij (tr)µ(tr)+
∫
t∈T0 bˆ
Γn
ij (t) =
∑
t∈T1 nbˆ
n
ij(t)
µ(t)
n +
∫
t∈T0 bˆ
n
ij(t) =∑
t∈T1 bˆ
n
ij(t)µ(t) +
∫
t∈T0 bˆ
n
ij(t) = bˆ
n
ij , i, j = 1, . . . , l, for n = 1, 2, . . .. Then,
pˆn = p(bˆn) as pˆn and bˆn satisfy (1), for n = 1, 2, . . .. But then, by continu-
ity, pˆ and bˆ must satisfy (1). Therefore, Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao implies
that
¯ˆ
B is completely reducible as pˆÀ 0. Moreover, bˆ(t) ∈ Bδ(t) since bˆ(t)
is a limit point of the sequence {bˆkn(t)}, for all t ∈ T . Then, bˆ is δ-positive.
But then, by Remark 3 in Sahi and Yao,
¯ˆ
B must be irreducible. Consider
the pair (pˆ, xˆ). It is straightforward to show that the assignment xˆ is an
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allocation as pˆ and bˆ satisfy (1) and that xˆ(t) ∈ {x ∈ Rl+ : pˆx = pˆw(t)}, for
all t ∈ T . Suppose that (pˆ, xˆ) is not a Walras equilibrium of E. Then, there
exists a trader τ ∈ T and a commodity bundle x˜ ∈ {x ∈ Rl+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)}
such that uτ (x˜) > uτ (xˆ(τ)). By Lemma 5 in Codognato and Ghosal (2000),
there exist λ˜j ≥ 0, ∑lj=1 λ˜j = 1, such that
x˜j = λ˜j
∑l
i=1 pˆ
iwi(τ)
pˆj
, j = 1, . . . , l.
Let b˜ij = w
i(τ)λ˜j , i, j = 1, . . . , l. Then, it is straightforward to verify that
x˜j = wj(τ)−
l∑
i=1
b˜ji +
l∑
i=1
b˜ij
pˆi
pˆj
,
for each j = 1, . . . , l. Consider the following cases.
Case 1. τ ∈ T1. Let {hn} denote a sequence such that hn = kn, if k1 > 1,
hn = kn+1, otherwise, for n = 1, 2, . . .. Let ρ denote the k1-th element of
the n-fold replication of E and let BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ) denote the aggregate matrix
corresponding to the strategy selection bˆΓ
hn \ b˜(τρ), where b˜(τρ) = b˜, for
n = 1, 2, . . .. Let ∆BˆΓhn , ∆BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ), and ∆Bˆhn denote the matrices
of row sums of, respectively, BˆΓhn , BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ), and Bˆhn , for n = 1, 2, . . ..
Moreover, let qΓ
hn
, qΓ
hn
τρ , and q
hn denote the vectors of the cofactors of the
first column of, respectively, ∆BˆΓhn − BˆΓhn , ∆BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ)− BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ),
and ∆Bˆhn − Bˆhn , for n = 1, 2, . . .. Clearly, qΓhn = qhn as BˆΓhn = Bˆhn ,
for n = 1, 2, . . .. Let ∆
¯ˆ
B be the matrix of row sums of
¯ˆ
B and q be
the cofactors of the first column of ∆
¯ˆ
B − ¯ˆB. The sequences {qΓhn} and
{qhn} converge to q as the sequence Bˆhn converges to ¯ˆB and qΓhn = qhn ,
for n = 1, 2, . . .. Let w¯ = max{w1(τ), . . . ,wl(τ)}. Consider the matrix
BˆΓhn − BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ), for n = 1, 2, . . .. Then, bˆΓhnij − bˆΓhnij \ b˜ij(τρ) =
( 1n bˆ
Γhn
ij (τρ) − 1n b˜ij(τρ)), i, j = 1, . . . , l, for n = 1, 2, . . .. But then, the
sequence of Euclidean differences {‖BˆΓhn − BˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ)‖} converges to 0
as | 1n bˆΓ
hn
ij (τρ)− 1n b˜ij(τρ)|= 1n |bˆΓ
hn
ij (τρ)− b˜ij(τρ)| ≤ 1n w¯, i, j = 1, . . . , l, n =
1, 2, . . .. The sequence {BˆΓhn\b˜(τρ)} converges to ¯ˆB as ‖BˆΓhn\b˜(τρ)}− ¯ˆB‖ ≤
‖BˆΓhn−BˆΓhn \b˜(τρ)‖+‖BˆΓhn− ¯ˆB‖ = ‖BˆΓhn−BˆΓhn \b˜(τρ)‖+‖Bˆhn− ¯ˆB‖, for
n = 1, 2, . . ., the sequence {‖BˆΓhn−BˆΓhn \b˜(τρ)‖} converges to 0, and the se-
quence {‖Bˆhn− ¯ˆB‖} converges to 0. Then, the sequence {qΓhnτρ } converges to
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q. uτρ(x(τρ, bˆ
Γhn (τρ), p(bˆΓ
hn
))) ≥ uτρ(x(τρ, bˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ), p(bˆΓhn \ b˜(τρ))))
as bˆΓ
hn
is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of
Γhn , for n = 1, 2, . . .. Let bˆhn\b˜(τ) be a strategy selection obtained by replac-
ing bˆhn(τ) in bˆhn with b˜, for n = 1, 2, . . .. Then, uτ (x(τ, bˆ
hn(τ), qΓ
hn
)) ≥
uτ (x(τ, bˆ
hn \ b˜(τ), qΓhnτρ )) as bˆhn(τ) = bˆΓ
hn
(τρ), p(bˆΓ
hn
) = αnq
Γhn , with
αn > 0, by Lemma 2 in Sahi and Yao, bˆ
Γhn \ b˜(τρ) = bˆhn \ b˜(τ), and
p(bˆΓ
hn \ b˜(τρ)) = βnqΓhnτρ , with βn > 0, by Lemma 2 in Sahi and Yao, for
n = 1, 2, . . .. But then, uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (x˜), by Assumption 2, as the se-
quence {bˆhn(τ)} converges to bˆ(τ), the sequence {qΓhn} converges to q, the
sequence {qΓhnτρ } converges to q, and pˆ = θq, with θ > 0, by Lemma 2 in
Sahi and Yao, a contradiction.
Case 2. τ ∈ T0. Let {bˆhkn (τ)} be a subsequence of the sequence {bˆkn(τ)}
which converges to bˆ(τ). Moreover, let bˆΓ
hkn \ b˜(τ) be a strategy se-
lection obtained by replacing bˆhkn (τ) in bˆΓ
hkn with b˜, for n = 1, 2, . . ..
uτ (x(τ, bˆ
Γhkn (τ), p(bˆΓ
hkn ))) ≥ uτ (x(τ, bˆΓ
hkn \b˜(τ), p(bˆΓhkn \b˜(τ)))) as bˆΓhkn
is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γhkn , for
n = 1, 2, . . .. Let bˆhkn \ b˜(τ) be a strategy selection obtained by replacing
bˆhkn (τ) in bˆhkn with b˜, for n = 1, 2, . . ... Then, uτ (x(τ, bˆ
hkn (τ), pˆhkn )) ≥
uτ (x(τ, bˆ
hkn \ b˜(τ), pˆhkn )) as bˆhkn (τ) = bˆΓhkn (τ), pˆhkn = p(bˆΓhkn ), bˆΓhkn \
b˜(τ) = bˆhkn \ b˜(τ), and pˆhkn = p(bˆΓhkn \ b˜(τ)). But then, uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (x˜),
by Assumption 2, as the sequence {bˆhkn (τ)} converges to bˆ(τ) and the se-
quence {phkn} converges to pˆ, a contradiction.
Hence, the pair (pˆ, xˆ) is a Walras equilibrium of E.
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